Monetary policy rules, real rigidity and endogenous persistence by Bratsiotis, GJ & Martin, C
 
Monetary Policy Rules, Real Rigidity 
and Endogenous Persistence 
 
 
George J. Bratsiotis* 
School of Economic Studies 
University of Manchester 
Dover Street, 
Manchester M13 9PL,UK. 
and 
Centre of Growth and Business Cycle Research (CGBCR) 
 
Christopher Martin 
Department of Economics 
Brunel University 
Uxbridge 
Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK. 
 
 
December 2002 
 
Abstract 
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cost to output and through this channel they are shown to determine (i) the degree of 
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1.  Introduction 
In the last few years New Keynesian economics has shown that small nominal 
frictions may not be substantial to explain large fluctuation in aggregate activity, 
unless they are combined with real rigidity. Real rigidities alone cannot impede full 
nominal flexibility but as Ball and Romer (1990), Romer (2001) and the subsequent 
literature shows, the combination of small nominal frictions with real rigidities are 
capable of generating output variations similar to those observed in actual data. This 
is because real rigidities feed endogenously into the degree of nominal rigidity -or 
nominal persistence in dynamic models- thus amplifying and prolonging the real 
effects of any type of shock. 
 
 An already vast existing literature, has shown that real rigidity can be found in 
imperfections in the product, labour, capital and financial markets.1 A predicament 
however frequently associated with this literature is whether the size of the real 
rigidity required to produce substantial nominal and real persistence, can be obtained 
for realistic parameter values in such models. Taking for example the two potential 
sources of real rigidity explored in Ball and Romer (1990), namely asymmetric 
demand and efficiency wages. Both of these sources are capable of generating real 
rigidities, but as Ball and Romer (1990) points out real rigidity in the former type of 
models is determined by the “sharpness of the asymmetry in demand, a parameter for 
which we do not know realistic values”. Similarly, Kiley (1997) argues that 
efficiency-wage models may not be an appropriate source of real rigidity because 
although they can generate acyclical real wages they do not necessarily imply a lower 
sensitivity of marginal cost to output or increased nominal persistence. From the 
empirical point of view, as sources of real rigidities are usually identified in small 
imperfections and in specific markets in the economy, it is difficult to assess their 
wider macroeconomic impact.     
 
                                                 
1 For a review of the related literature see Romer (2001), Benassi, Chirco and Colombo, (1994) and 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989). 
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 In this paper we focus on the role of endogenous monetary policy as a new 
potential source of real rigidity and macro persistence. Whether policy rules can affect 
the degree of persistence is of course a well-established result that can be traced 
among others to Taylor (1980) and has been extensively examined more recently in 
dynamic general equilibrium models including, King and Watson (1996), Yun (1996), 
Rotemberg (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Gavin and Kydland (1999), 
Ireland (2001), etc. However, this literature is not concerned with real rigidities, it 
rather focuses on the various effects of endogenous money supply on the degree of 
persistence. This is in contrast to the bulk of the New Keynesian literature on real 
rigidities, that explicitly focus on how imperfections in the economy can generate real 
rigidity, but conventionally assumes an exogenous money supply. Some interesting 
examples of this literature include, Woglom (1982), Mankiw (1985), Ball and Romer 
(1990), Hairault and Portier (1993), Benassi, Chirco and Colombo (1994), Kiley 
(1997, 1998), Jeanne (1998), Devereux and Yetman (2002) etc.  
 
This paper attempts to provide a link between the two existing literatures. By 
focusing on the role of endogenous monetary policy, we examine whether and to what 
extent monetary policy rules can affect the degree of real rigidity and through this 
very channel the degree of endogenous persistence. Most research on real rigidity 
starts out to identify sources of real rigidity by assuming that aggregate demand is 
exogenously set. However, monetary policy rules, used widely by central banks, are 
set as a function of prices and output.  We show that monetary policy preferences 
affect the slope of the aggregate demand curve. At the firm level this is shown to 
affect the responsiveness of marginal cost to changes in output. This results in 
monetary policy endogenously affecting the degrees of both real rigidity and nominal 
persistence. More importantly, we show that plausible values of monetary policy 
parameters can attain high degrees of real rigidity and nominal persistence without 
relying on any market imperfections or other exogenous sources of real rigidity as 
assumed previously.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present a 
microfounded model from which we derive the product demand, labour supply and 
optimal price decisions in each sector. Section 3, shows how monetary policy rules 
can endogenously affect these decisions and the degree of real rigidity. Section 4, 
extends the model to account for the effects of real rigidity in a Calvo-type price 
staggering model. In this section we examine how monetary policy rules, through 
their effect on real rigidities, can amplify persistence effects. Both sections 3 and 4 are 
supported with numerical simulations. Section 5 briefly discusses the implications of 
the model for the size of real rigidity required to explain actual observed persistence 
and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
We consider a simple economy consisting of a continuum of imperfectly competitive 
firms, indexed by j, each producing a slightly different commodity and distributed 
uniformly over the interval [0,1].2 The economy is populated by many identical 
households, indexed by i, and distributed also uniformly over the interval [0,1]. Each 
typical household, consumes goods from all firms, receives a monetary transfer in the 
beginning of each period, supplies Li units of labour in a firm, at the competitive wage 
rate, and receives an equal share of profits from all sectors. The money supply is set 
by the central bank according to a monetary policy rule. 
 
2.1 Monetary Policy Rule 
The central bank follows a simple monetary policy rule, mimicking a Taylor rule, 
where the money supply is set in response to deviations in consumer price index and 
output from their target levels respectively.3 
 
                                                 
2 As we show below the assumption of imperfectly competitive firms play no crucial role in this model, 
though it does provide a rationale for price setting.  
3 Although it is certainly true that central bank manage stabilisation policy through short-term interest 
rates, the use of this particular monetary -rather than interest rate policy rule- is used merely for 
expositional convenience with no loss in generality (see also Bratsiotis and Martin, 1999). We expect 
the implications of our results to be robust with a Taylor rule.   
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tM  is an exogenous component of money supply. 1tM −  and tM  are the initial and 
current levels of money stock respectively. TP  and TY  are the target or desired 
levels of price and output respectively. The higher is φ  the higher is the weight that 
the policy maker attached on price stability, whereas a ψ  implies a higher concern for 
output stability. When 0φ ψ= = , monetary policy is set completely exogenously, 
through tM .  
Equilibrium in the money markets is reached when the desired level of total 
money held by all representative agents, is equal to the total money stock supplied by 
the central bank, 
1
,0 i t ti
M di M= =∫ .   
 
2.2 Households and Product Demand   
As with most of the recent literature (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987) we assume 
households derive utility from the consumption of goods from all industries and from 
holding real money balances, but their utility decreases with the amount of labour 
they supply,  
 
(2)  
1
,
, , ,
i t
i t i t i t
M
U C L
P
γ
γ δ
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,   (0,1),γ ∈  ( 1) / 0δ η η= + > ,   0η > . 
 
(3) where ( ) /( 1)1 ( 1) /, ,0 ,i t ji tjC C dj σ σσ σ −−== ∫   1.σ >  
 
(4)  ( )1/(1 )1 (1 ),0t j tjP P dj σσ −−== ∫  
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Cji and Ci are the consumption of each product j and the total consumption basket of a 
typical household i. Li are the units of labour supplied by each worker in their firm. 
1δ −  is the marginal disutility of labour and η  measures the labour supply elasticity, 
while σ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods in a typical 
household’s utility.4  For simplicity, all consumption goods enter utility 
symmetrically. The representative household located in industry j maximises utility 
by taking prices and wages as given and subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
(5)  
1
, , , , , 1 , ,0t i t i t i t i t i t ji t i tj
PC M W L mM V I− =+ = + + ≡∫  
 
Mi0 denotes the initial money holdings of the typical household i in each industry, 
while Mi is the amount of money the household desires to hold. The initial money 
transfers of each household grow, by the end of the period, at the rate 
1
t
t
M
Mm −= , 
which is determined by the response of the money supply rule in equation (1).  Wi is 
the hourly wage rate earned by each agent and Vji is the share of profits from each 
firm j distributed to each typical household i.  From the maximisation problem 
described by equation (2)-(5), the typical household, chooses the desired levels of 
consumption for each commodity j and desired money balances, 
 
(6)  ,, ,,
j ti t i t
ji t
t
PI M
C
P P
σ−−  =   
 
 
(7)  , ,(1 )i t i tM Iγ= −  
 
Substituting equation (7) into (6) and aggregating over all households in the economy 
using 
1
, ,0j t ji ti
C C di== ∫ , we obtain the total consumption of each product j, 
                                                 
4 The implications of these parameters are examined in more detail later. 
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Equilibrium in the goods markets implies, j jC Y= . Using this and corresponding 
money market equilibrium condition defined above, we obtain the total demand for 
each product j: 
 
(9)  ,, 1
j tt
j t
t t
PM
Y
P P
σγ
γ
−  =   −   
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Equation (9) represents the conventional product demand function in a monopolistic 
model of differentiated goods, with unit income elasticity of demand.    
 
2.3  Exogenous Monetary Policy and Real Rigidity    
Each firm j produces output according to the labour-based production function,  
 
(10)  , ,j t j tY L
α= ,   1α < , 
 
and chooses its optimal price based on a standard profit maximisation function,   
 
(11)  , , , , ,j t j t j t j t j tV P Y W L= −  
 
Using equation (9), (10) and (11), the optimal real price is set as a mark-up over real 
marginal cost: 
 
(12)   
*
,
,
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j j t
t
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P
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P
α α
α
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where jµ  and jMC  denote the price mark-up and the real marginal cost of firm j 
respectively. Given price and wages, household derive their optimal labour supply so 
to maximise their indirect utility. Substituting equations (6) and (7) into (2) we derive 
the indirect utility of the representative household,  
 
(13)  ,, ,
i t
i t i t
t
I
U L
P
δγ= − ,   1(1 ) γ γγ γ γ−= −  
 
Given this and equation (5), representative households in each sector choose their 
optimal levels of labour supply which we express in terms of real wages,    
 
(14)  , 1/,
j t
j t
t
W
Y
P
αηθ
γ=   
 
From equation  (14), the output response of the competitive real wage is shown to be 
determined by the returns to scale (α) and the market power of the firm (η). 
Substituting equation (14) into MC, using equations (9), (10) and (12) we obtain, 
 
(15)  ( ),,
b
bj t
j t t
t
P
MC Y
P
σθ
αγ
− =   
 
 
where, 
1
,0 1t j tj
MY Y dj
P
γ
γ=
 ≡ =  −  ∫  is the aggregate demand based on equation (9).  
The parameter 1 (1 ) 0b η ααη
+ −= >  determines the elasticity of the real marginal cost 
to output.5  The lower is b the more acyclical becomes marginal cost to changes in 
output and so the flatter becomes the MC curve and the higher is real rigidity.  
  
From equations (15) and (12) we derive the optimal real price equation:  
                                                 
5 Having assumed decreasing returns to scale (α<1), b is strictly positive.  
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(16)  ( )
/
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t
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where 1( 1/ ) 0bρ σ −= + ≥ , measures inversely the degree of real rigidity, as defined 
by Ball and Romer (1990). In particular, with a unit income elasticity of demand, 
( log( ) / log( / ) 1Y M P∂ ∂ = ), we obtain log( / ) / log( / )d Pi P d M P ρ= . From the 
definition of ρ, real rigidity is shown to be decreasing the higher is the output 
response of the real marginal cost (b) and the more competitive is the products market 
(σ). Intuitively this is because for higher values of b and lower values of σ, the MC 
curve becomes steeper, raising the additional profits from adjusting prices.  
 
Table 1 provides estimates for the marginal costs elasticity and real rigidity 
for different utility and production parameters. Note that by assuming an exogenous 
money supply (φ=ψ=0), constant returns to scale (α=1) and using the empirically 
supported values of η=0.15 and σ=7.7, used in Ball and Romer (1990), this model 
also generates a real rigidity of only 0.127. 6 This value is denoted by a star (*) in 
Table 1, and forms the baseline case in both Ball and Romer (1990) and in our model. 
Having assumed perfectly competitive labour markets, Table 1, confirms the 
predicament emerging in this literature (see Ball and Romer 1990, Romer 2001) that 
high degrees of real rigidity can only be achieved for unrealistically high elasticities 
of the labour supply (η) and strongly competitive market structure (σ), which is not 
supported by empirical evidence.  An additional observation here is that the lower are 
the returns to scale (α) the higher becomes the elasticity of the marginal cost (b) and 
the lower is real rigidity. This is true for variations in η rather than σ, since with 
labour being the only input in the production it is combinations of the labour market 
elasticity and returns to scale that are important for the elasticity of the marginal cost. 
 
                                                 
6 Note that a mark-up value of 0.15, as assumed in Romer and Ball (1990), also implies that σ=ε=7.7 in 
this model, however since in this model we are not concerned with menu costs our analysis suppresses 
the role of the mark-up. 
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3. Endogenous monetary policy and real rigidity   
Monetary policy preferences affect the slope of the AD curve.  We can show this 
formally by substituting equation (1) into the aggregate demand -as shown in equation 
(15)- to obtain,   
 
(17)  
1 1
1 1
1
t
t t
M
Y P
φψ ψγ
γ
 +−+  +  =  − 
 
 
where 1exp( )
T T
t t tM M Y P M
ψ φ
−=   denotes the exogenous level of the money stock. 
Equation (17) shows the familiar negative relationship between aggregate price and 
output to be determined also by the monetary policy parameters, φ and ψ.  The more 
responsive is the aggregate price level to money (measured by φ) the flatter is the AD 
curve. This is depicted in figure 1. A higher weight on price targeting, (φ), makes 
demand more sensitive the aggregate price level and the aggregate demand flatter,  
Table 1.  Exogenous Money supply and Real Rigidity  
 
φ = ψ = 0  
 Output elasticity of MC (b)   Real Rigidity  
(ρ ) 
Labour (η) and 
product (σ) market 
competitiveness  α=1.0 α=0.6 α=0.2 α=1.0 α=0.6 α=0.2 
(σ=5.0)       η=0.15 
                     η=0.7 
                     η=2.0 
                    η=25.0 
                    η=100.0 
 
6.666 
1.428 
0.500 
0.040 
0.010 
11.77 
3.047 
1.500 
0.733 
0.683 
37.33 
11.14 
6.500 
4.200 
4.050 
0.194 
0.175 
0.142 
0.033 
0.009 
0.196 
0.187 
0.176 
0.157 
0.154 
0.198 
0.196 
0.194 
0.192 
0.190 
(η=0.15)       σ=1.5 
σ=7.7 
σ=15.0 
σ=30.0 
σ=100.0 
6.667 
6.667* 
6.667 
6.667 
6.667 
11.77 
11.77 
11.77 
11.77 
11.77 
37.33 
37.33 
37.33 
37.33 
37.33 
0.606 
  0.127* 
0.066 
0.033 
0.009 
0.630 
0.128 
0.066 
0.033 
0.009 
0.654 
0.129 
0.066 
0.033 
0.009 
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Figure 1. Policy preferences and the slope of aggregate demand 
 
 
whereas a higher weight on output targeting, (ψ), makes the aggregate demand less 
responsive to aggregate price and the AD curve steeper. Strict price targeting implies 
a horizontal aggregate demand at the price target ( TP ) whereas strict output targeting 
implies a vertical aggregate demand curve at the output target  ( TY ), (see also Taylor, 
1999)  
 
The parameters of the monetary policy rule also affect the supply side of the 
economy.  This become more transparent if we express the optimal price of the firm 
(equation 16), as a function of the aggregate price level and exogenous money. Using 
aggregate demand, as shown in equation (15) and assuming, initially, an exogenous 
money supply equation (16) can be written as, 7 
 
 (18)  
/
* 1
, 1
b
j t
j t t
M
P P
ρ ρ
ρδµ γ
αγ γ
−   =    −  
, 
                                                 
7  See also Romer (2001, p.285), Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p.385)   
TP
0( )oAD φ
1 1 0( )AD φ φ>
( )AD φ → ∞
P
( ( , , , ), )Y Y M P Y Pφ ψ=
( )AD ψ →∞
TY
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The lower is ρ in equation (18) the higher is real rigidity.  With ρ→0 prices are fixed 
and acyclical. Conversely, as ρ→∞ the optimal price responds fully to changes in 
aggregate demand and so real rigidity is fully eliminated. 
 
The implications of monetary policy at the firm level can be shown by 
substituting equation (17) into the real marginal cost, equation (15)  
 
(19)  
1
11,
, 1
bb
bj t t
j t t
t
P M
MC P
P
φ
ψ
σ ψγδ
αγ γ
+
+
−  −+      =    −  
 
 
The more responsive is the aggregate price level in relation to exogenous money the 
higher is the cost of any producer from not adjusting their price  (see also Blanchard 
and Fischer, 1989). Here, a higher weight on price targeting, (φ), makes the aggregate 
price level more responsive to any level of money stock (a flatter AD) and this is 
shown to make the real marginal cost more sensitive to changes in the aggregate price 
level in equation (19). In effect the higher is φ, the more responsive become price 
adjustments to any shock that affect the aggregate price level. A higher weight on 
output targeting (ψ) is shown to make the real marginal cost less responsive to total 
aggregate demand, (i.e. to both exogenous money and the aggregate price level). thus 
raising real rigidity. The latter effect can be seen more clearly by focusing explicitly 
on output stability (i.e. φ=0), in which case equation (16) or (19) are now replaced by   
 
(20)  
/(1 )
,
, 1
b b
j t t
j t
t t
P MMC
P P
σ ψγδ
αγ γ
− +   =    −   
.   
 
From equation (20) it is clear that the higher is the value of output stability (ψ) the 
lower is the marginal cost response to aggregate demand. In effect, this reduces the 
costs from not adjusting to output variations, resulting in higher real rigidity.        
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Substituting equation (19) into the optimal real price, equation (12), we obtain,  
 
(21)  
ˆ/
ˆ* 1 (1 )
, 1
b
j t
j t t
M
P P
ρ ρ
ρ φδµ γ
αγ γ
− +   =    −  
 
 
Comparing equations (18) and (21), we observe that monetary policy preferences 
affect endogenously the degree of real rigidity, ˆ 0
1
ρρ ψ= ≥+ . Expressing equation 
(21) in logs,8  
 
(22)  ( ) ( )*, ˆ ˆlog( /(1 )) 1 (1 )j t t tp c m pρ γ γ ρ φ= + − + + − + , 
 
where ( )x Log X=  and ( / )jc logb
ρ δµ αγ=   is a constant determined by factors 
specific to the market structure, such as the degree of competitiveness in the product 
and labour markets and the mark-up, all of which are assumed to be fixed in this 
model.  Real rigidity is now measured by the parameter ρˆ , which reaches its 
maximum when ˆ 0ρ →  resulting in *,j t tp p c− = , in which case the optimal real price 
does not respond to changes in aggregate demand but it is fixed at the level 
determined by the constant c.  From equations (19) - (22) a higher preference for 
output stability (a higher ψ) is shown reduce the marginal cost and this lowers the 
response of the optimal price to the aggregate price level. If the central bank pursues 
strict output targeting, (ψ →∞ ), then the aggregate demand becomes completely 
inelastic, and the real marginal cost become insensitive to aggregate prices (flat), 
ˆ 0ρ →  and equation (22) results in *,j t tp p c− = .  Price targeting is shown to make 
price setting more sensitive to changes in the aggregate price level. This is because 
under price targeting a central bank is prepared to reduce real aggregate demand by 
                                                 
8 Note that because the monetary policy rule we consider here targets the aggregate levels of both 
output and prices, equation (21) is not homogeneous of degree one in output (i.e. in both M and P). 
The latter is true when the monetary rule targets only output (i.e. setting φ=0).     
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whatever amount is required in order to eliminate price deviations from its price 
target, ( TP ). This makes marginal costs very sensitive to changes in aggregate prices 
and as ρˆ  becomes very large, optimal real prices become perfectly elastic to the price 
target. Table 2 below, provides numerical examples of the effects of different 
monetary policy parameters on real rigidity. We discuss these in more details in 
section 4. 
 
 
4.  Monetary policy and endogenous persistence    
We have so far shown that by affecting the aggregate demand elasticity of marginal 
cost, monetary policy can endogenously affect the degrees of real rigidity.  In the 
absence of nominal frictions of course, and in the symmetric equilibrium where 
*
iP P= , real rigidities become ineffective. In what follows we introduce nominal 
stickiness that enables real rigidity to be internalised into nominal persistence. We 
show that through their affect on real rigidity, monetary policy parameters can have 
an amplifying effect on macroeconomic persistence.  
 
Consider, following Calvo (1983), an infrequent price setting where in every 
period the price of each firm has a fixed probability (1-q), of remaining fixed at the 
previous period’s price and a fixed probability q of being adjusted. In the absence of 
relative price friction (q=1) and given symmetry, each firm j will choose its optimal 
price ( *,j tp ) based on the symmetric Nash-equilibrium price obtained by setting 
*
,j t tp p=  in equation (17), or equation (22) with endogenous money supply.  
However, in the presence of infrequent price adjustments each firm setting a new 
price at time t, will chose the price contract that maximizes the present discounted 
value of expected future profits. Denoting the new price rule as Pˆ , the firms now 
maximizes,  
 
 14 
(23)   , , , , , ,
0
ˆ ˆ((1 ) ) { [ ] [ ]}s j t j t s j t j t s j t s j t s
s
q P Y P W L Yβ∞ + + + +
=
− −∑  
 
where β  is the firm’s discount factor and E is the expectations operator using the 
informational set available at time t.9  From equation (23), and denoting 
, , , ,[ ]j t s j t s j t s j t sW L Y MC+ + + +′ ≡  all firms adjusting their price at time t will choose the 
same new optimal price,  
 
(24)  , ,0,
,0
((1 ) ) { }ˆ
((1 ) ) { }
s
j j t s j t s t ss
j t s
j t ss
q MC Y P
P
q Y
µ β
β
∞
+ + +=
∞
+=
−=
−
∑
∑  
 
Log-linearising equation (24) and using the definition *, ,log( )j t j j t tp mc pµ= + +  
from the log of equation (12) we obtain,10  
 
(25) *, ,0ˆ [1 (1 ) ] ((1 ) ) { }
s
j t j t ssp q q pβ β∞ +== − − −∑   
     
*
1ˆ[1 (1 ) ] (1 )t t tq p q E pβ β += − − + −  
 
From equation (25) the new price chosen by all firms adjusting prices at time t is 
shown to be forward-looking. This equation explains the sources of persistence 
arising from nominal rather than real rigidity. 1/q represents the expected time 
between price adjustments and so the higher is the probability of the price not being 
renewed in future periods (the lower is q) the higher will be the nominal rigidity.11   
 
                                                 
9 Note that since uncertainty plays no important role in this model, the assumption of a constant 
discount factor is an appropriate simplification.  
10 Because sectors are identical, apart from the timing of their price adjustment, the subscript j is 
dropped on the optimal price.   
11 The expected time of the price being fixed can be calculated as follows:  
  2
0
(1 )2 (1 ) 3... (1 ) (1 ) 1/s
s
q q q q q q q s q
∞
=
+ − + − = − + =∑  . 
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The aggregate price is given by the sum of all prices still in force and given by 
 
(26)   1ˆ (1 )t t tp qp q p −= + −  
 
Using (26) we substitute pˆ  out of (25) to obtain,  
 
(27) ( ) *1 12 21 (1 (1 ) )1 (1 ) 1 (1 )t t t t t
q q qp p E p p
q q
βββ β− +
− − −= + ++ − + −  
 
Finally, substituting *tp , equation (22), into equation (27) we obtain 
  
(28)  1 1( )t t t t tp p E p k xθ β θ− += + +   
 
where ˆ (log( /(1 )) )
1t t
x c mρ γ γφ= + − ++ ; ( )
1ˆ1 (1 ) 0kθ β ρ φ −= + + + > ;  and 
1
1( ) 0qk q β−= − > . Normalising for simplicity the initial level of the money stock  
( 1tM − ) to unity and solving the second order difference equation in (27), we obtain, 
 
(29)  11 1
(1 )
1t t t
p p p mλλ φ−
−= + + +   
 
where, 1 1
1
ˆ (1 ) (log( /(1 )) )
1 1
T Tq cp p yλ λ γ γ φ ψβλ φ
−= + − + +− +  is a constant and 
2
1
1 1 4
2
βθλ βθ
− −=  is the stable root of the dynamic equation (14) which measures the 
degree of nominal persistence. Writing equation (29) in terms of first difference in log 
deviations, (i.e. 1t t tp pπ −= − ) we obtain,   
 
 16 
(30)  11 1
(1 )
1t t t
mλπ λ π φ−
−= + ∆+  , 
 
and using equation (30) and the log of equation (18) and re-arranging, price stickiness 
is shown to generate the following output persistence,  
 
(31)   11 1 1( )1t t t t
y y m mλλ ψ− −∆ = ∆ + ∆ −∆+    
 
Equations (30) and (31) explain how monetary policy rules affect endogenously 
macro persistence. The closer is 1λ  to unity, the slower is the speed of price 
adjustment and so the more prolonged are the effects of demand shocks.12  
Conversely, as 1λ →0, persistence is eliminated and prices respond fully to shocks.   
In this model endogenous persistence is generated through the monetary policy 
parameters.  For any value of 0 1q< < , a higher ψ  results in a higher ρˆ  and a higher 
θ  and from equations (30) and (31) this is shown to increase macroeconomic 
persistence ( 1λ ). As  ψ →∞ , real rigidity approaches its maximum, ( ˆ 0ρ → ), 
( ) 11θ β −→ +  and 1λ → 1 and so persistence reaches its maximum value. Intuitively, 
very strict output targeting results in a constant economic growth 1t ty y −∆ = ∆ .  The 
higher is φ, the higher becomes the response of optimal prices to the aggregate price 
level and this reduces macroeconomic persistence. As φ →∞ , 1λ → 1.13 Intuitively, 
very strict price targeting results in zero inflation, 1( ) ( ) 0t t tLog P Log P π−− ≡ = .   
 
 
                                                 
12 Here for simplicity we have allowed for exogenous aggregate demand shocks, through M , the 
dynamic implications however of our model are expected to be true for any type of shocks.  As Romer 
(2001) suggests, one need not focus on monetary disturbances. The important issue here is how real 
rigidity can affect endogenously the degree of nominal persistence by prolonging the effects of any 
type of shocks.   
13 Note that as φ →∞ , 1λ → 1 before θ→ 1. 
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Table 2. Monetary Policy, Real Rigidity and Endogenous Persistence 
 
Base Case* (Ball and Romer, 1990): η=0.15, σ =7.7, α=1, (β=0.8). 
 
Nominal Persistence 
( 1λ ) 
Monetary Policy 
Parameters 
(φ, ψ) 
 
 
Real Rigidity 
( ρˆ ) 
 q=0.8 q=0.5 q=0.3 
  Base case* :      φ =ψ = 0* 
 
For output: (φ=0)      ψ=0.2 
                                ψ=0.6 
                                ψ=1.5 
                                ψ=2.0 
ψ=15.0 
ˆ 0.127 *ρ ρ= =
 
0.106 
0.079 
0.050 
0.042 
0.007 
0.562 
 
0.594 
0.644 
0.714 
0.740 
0.910 
0.818 
 
0.838 
0.865 
0.901 
0.913 
0.978 
0.917 
 
0.927 
0.942 
0.960 
0.965 
0.992 
For price: (ψ=0)        φ=0.2 
                                φ=0.6 
                                φ=1.5 
                                φ=2.0 
                                φ=15.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.562 
0.475 
0.391 
0.357 
0.116 
0.797 
0.761 
0.697 
0.669 
0.366 
0.905 
0.883 
0.843 
0.825 
0.581 
Policy mix:   φ=1.2,  ψ=0.5 
φ=0.5,  ψ=1.2  
φ=0.85,  ψ=1.2  
                     φ=1.0,  ψ=2.5 
0.084 
0.057 
0.057 
0.036 
0.491 
0.629 
0.593 
0.659 
0.772 
0.857 
0.837 
0.873 
0.890 
0.938 
0.927 
0.946 
 
 
 
Table 2, provides numerical simulations that demonstrate how different 
monetary policy preferences affect endogenously the degree of real rigidity 
persistence. For better transparency we use again as our benchmark, the exogenous 
money supply baseline case (denoted by a star)- used by Ball and Romer (1990), 
where ρ=0.127. This value is independent of the monetary policy parameters and so 
its persistence depends on the exogenous assumptions about nominal rigidity (q).  As 
the model suggests, higher values of ψ increase the degree of real rigidity. For 
example for the same baseline values a modest weight on output, of ψ=1.5, is shown 
to produce ˆ 0.050ρ =  which is more than double the real rigidity shown in the 
baseline case. Similarly, as the central bank increases ψ, real rigidity becomes higher 
and endogenous persistence increases, whereas a higher weight on price targeting is  
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Figure 2.  Output (ψ) and price (φ) preferences, real rigidity and persistence 
 
shown to reduce directly nominal persistence as it makes optimal price more 
responsive to the aggregate price level.   For example, assuming that the average 
duration of price fixity is just above 3/4 quarters  (i.e. q=0.8), then a typical value of 
ψ=1.5 (a value frequently used in central bank model simulations) is capable of 
raising persistence from 1λ =0.562 in the baseline case to a substantial 1λ =0.714. The 
opposite is true for policy preferences aiming at price stability that reduce persistence.  
A graphical presentation of the relationship between, the monetary policy parameters, 
real rigidity and persistence, is provided in Figure 2. 
 
The intuition of our result is the following.  The more determined is the central 
bank to maintain price stability, the faster the aggregate price level will converge to 
its target and so the higher will be the cost to the firm from not adjusting prices, 
following a shock. As a result price targeting makes price setting more sensitive to 
changes in aggregate price and this reduces persistence. Output targeting on the other 
hand implies smaller costs from not adjusting prices, since even large price changes 
will fail to ensure significant output changes when the central bank pursues an output 
target. As a result, output targeting make price setting less sensitive to changes in 
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output and this raises real rigidity and amplifies persistence. This way, monetary 
policy preferences are shown to determine the degree of real rigidity and persistence.   
 
Finally, notice that our results are independent of any imperfections in the 
economy. Although for price setting behaviour it is important to look at imperfectly 
competitive firms, relaxing the assumption of monopolistic profits (µ=0), does not 
affect the degree of real rigidity. Also, because the price elasticity of demand in this 
model is constant and equal to σ. This implies that real rigidity in this models is 
independent of both the mark-up and other assumptions about the marginal revenue 
curve of the firm, as shown in models where the source of rigidity is asymmetric 
product demand due to imperfect information, (Ball and Romer 1990). 
 
 
5.  Are real and nominal rigidities substitutes?    
The results in this paper are consistent with the suggestion by Ball and Romer (1990) 
that higher degrees of real rigidity, regardless of the source, will magnify nominal 
rigidities and persistence. In this model, we showed that monetary policy itself can act 
as a potential source of real rigidity that will crucially determine the degree of 
persistence. However, a close examination of the theoretical model in conjunction 
with Table 2, suggest that that nominal persistence may act as a substitute for real 
rigidity and so we do not require high levels of both to produce substantial 
persistence.  This observation is consistent with Jeanne (1998) who claims that even 
for plausible levels of real rigidity a small degree of nominal rigidity is sufficient to 
produce economic fluctuations as persistence as those observed in the data.  
 
In this model, because real rigidity and persistence are shown to be sensitive 
to monetary policy preferences, the substitution between nominal and real rigidity 
appears to be even stronger. In particular, the substitution in this models seems to take 
place between the weight of output preferences (ψ) and the average expected time of 
prices being fixed (1/q).  For any value 0 1q< < , the higher is ψ and 1/q  (i.e. the 
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lower is q) the higher becomes 1λ . However it is also true that the higher is ψ, the 
smaller becomes the rate at which increases in 1/q generate higher persistence. In 
Table 2 for example, the higher is nominal rigidity (the lower is q) the smaller is the 
contribution of ψ  (and so of real rigidity ρˆ ) to the degree of persistence ( 1λ ).   Note 
that for 1q =  there is no persistence whereas for 0q =  nominal rigidity substitutes 
fully for real rigidity, as 1 1λ → , independently of the degree of real rigidity and the 
monetary policy parameters.  
 
The implications of this substitutability may have some important empirical 
considerations. It may help explain why some OECD countries, placing a higher 
concern on price than output stability, may still exhibit a high level of macroeconomic 
persistence, without the need of additional sources of real rigidities. For example for 
some typical values of 1.2φ =  and 0.5ψ = , and a reasonable value of 0.5q = , our 
baseline case is capable of generating an output persistence of 1 0.772λ = . This is 
almost identical to that produced by Jeanne (1998) for the US, 1 0.769
USλ = , using an 
AR(2) process, as suggested by Cohrane (1988).  For the same value of q a relatively 
lower preference on price than output stability, ( 0.5φ =  and 1.2ψ = ), generates a 
persistence of 1 0.857λ = , which is almost identical to that produced in the same 
study for Italy ( 1 0.852
ITλ = ).  Furthermore, policy weights of 0.85φ =  and 
1.2ψ = , combined with a lower frequency of price adjustment, 0.3q = , provide an 
output persistence of 1 0.927λ = , which is identical to that produced for France  
( 1 0.927
FRλ = ), a country with a higher price stability than Italy but a lower wage 
synchronization.  
 
 
6.  Concluding comments      
This paper suggests that monetary policy preferences may provide a substantial 
source of real rigidity. Building on the result by Ball and Romer (1990), namely that 
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the degree of real rigidity can crucially determine the degree of nominal frictions, this 
papers shows that monetary policy preferences affect the degree of real rigidity and 
through this channel they endogenously determine the degree of nominal and real 
persistence.   
 
Real marginal costs are believed to be a significant and quantitatively 
important determinant of inflation and output dynamics.  In this paper we show the 
policy rules aiming at output stability, make the aggregate demand steeper, resulting 
in a more acyclical marginal cost (a flatter marginal cost curve), a higher real rigidity 
and a higher persistence. Conversely, a higher preference for price stability makes 
individual price setting more sensitive to the aggregate price level and this raises the 
responsiveness of the marginal cost to cyclical movements, resulting in lower 
persistence. Interestingly, this paper shows that for very reasonable values of the 
monetary policy parameters we can replicate high degrees of real rigidity and 
persistence as those observed in real data. More important perhaps is the fact that 
these can be obtained without relying on any imperfections in the economy or 
additional sources of real rigidity that are confined to a specific market, as previously 
assumed in the literature.  
 
Our model also supports the view taken by Jeanne (1988), that nominal 
rigidity can act as substitute for real rigidity indicating that even for moderate values 
of real rigidity a small degree of nominal rigidity is sufficient to produce economic 
fluctuations as persistent as those observed in the data.  Although in general, our 
paper focuses on the theoretical aspects of the relationship between monetary policy, 
real rigidity and the macroeconomic persistence, there are clear empirical implications 
emerging from our results that may help us understand better the full implications of 
monetary policy rules.   
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